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The Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform: Empirical
Evidence from China
By CHONG-EN BAI, JIANGYONG LU, AND ZHIGANG TAO*
The reform of China’s state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) has been characterized by a grad-
ual and selective approach. In fact there was no
privatization at all until the mid-1990s, some 15
years after China started its economic reform.
Despite years of economic reform, state owner-
ship remains significant in the economy. Most
of the SOEs are unprofitable and the few excep-
tional ones tend to be sheltered by government
protection in selected industries. Yet China has
been enjoying one of the most spectacular
growth experiences in world history, and much
of the growth is driven by non-state-owned en-
terprises (non-SOEs), including foreign-invested
enterprises operating in China and China’s own
private enterprises.
Given the poor financial performance of
SOEs, the coexistence of state ownership and
private ownership in China is a puzzling phe-
nomenon. Does state ownership exist solely for
the benefit of politicians, as is modeled by An-
drei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1994), or
has state ownership played any role in China’s
spectacular growth? Is there any rationale be-
hind China’s gradual and selective approach
toward privatizing its SOEs? What types of
SOEs does the Chinese government choose to
privatize? What are the consequences of privati-
zation? In this paper, we offer a theory of SOE
reform in China, and make predictions regard-
ing the types of SOEs to be chosen for privat-
ization and the results of privatization. We
then present empirical evidence supporting the
basic premise of the theory and its theoretical
predictions.
I. Social Stability and China’s SOE Reform
Before China started economic reform in
1979, the government planned all economic ac-
tivities. In this system, all the firms were state
owned or de facto state owned. These firms
received funding from the government bank
according to the direction of the Central Plan-
ning Commission. They produced products that
were usually in short supply; sold them at a
price determined by the government; and did
not face any competitive pressure. They paid
workers low salaries but guaranteed their life-
time employment. They managed workers’ pen-
sions and provided many other services,
including health care and education expenses
for workers’ children. Because their objective
was not to pursue profit, the firms had little
incentive to deviate from the plan. Meanwhile,
despite their low income, workers could make
ends meet because they received rations of
many important products at low prices, as well
as some services provided by their employers
for free.
Despite its seeming stability, this system was
very inefficient. Enterprises and individuals had
no incentives, nor did they have the freedom to
improve efficiency. Furthermore, the system
left two other legacies. There was no social
security system that was independent of the
SOEs, and the financial system was very weak
because all financial activities were carried out
by one bank which served only as the cashier of
the central planner.
Economic reform started in 1979. At first,
SOEs were given more autonomy in their
operations, and restrictions on entry by non-
SOEs were gradually relaxed. Ownership re-
form started much later. With the massive
entry of non-SOEs, and the gradual privatiza-
tion of SOEs, two types of ownership came to
coexist. SOEs now have to compete with non-
SOEs in the market. Being grossly inefficient
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and ill-prepared for market competition,
SOEs have been losing to non-SOEs in every
possible measure of performance. Meanwhile,
SOEs are still subject to restrictions on firing
workers, and they have to honor their com-
mitment to a large number of retired former
employees. This makes the situation of SOEs
even worse. Studies have revealed that there is
as much as 30 percent surplus labor in China’s
SOEs, and a large amount of debt has been
accumulated by them.
In a mature market economy, it is more effi-
cient for firms to fire surplus labor and let the
independent social security system provide wel-
fare to these workers before they find new jobs.
There is, however, no well-functioning inde-
pendent social security system in China. Firms
have to maintain the employment of, or provide
welfare to, their surplus workers, which contrib-
utes to social stability. Therefore, firms in China
face the multiple challenges of production and
maintaining social stability, the latter of which
has an effect on the performance of all other
firms in the economy. Bai et al. (2000) offer a
multitask theory of SOE reform that captures
the production versus social stability trade-off.
Non-SOEs with strong incentives for produc-
tion have little interest in providing social sta-
bility. SOEs, however, do not mind keeping
surplus labor on the payrolls, given their muted
incentives for production. Three results follow
from the theory. First, given that the existing
level of social stability is low, it is optimal for
the government to keep a fraction of SOEs as a
second-best way of maintaining social stability.
Second, as a result of multitasking, SOEs’ fi-
nancial performance is inevitably poorer than
that of non-SOEs. This is not only because
SOEs have to spend resources on maintaining
social stability, but also because they are given
low-profit incentives by the government. Third,
when the level of social stability is higher, the
government should speed up the process of
privatization.
The weakness of the financial system also
implies a negative external effect of privatizing
on SOEs. When an SOE is privatized, its high
debt has to be restructured in order for its new
owner to be willing to acquire the firm. With an
efficient financial system, the restructuring of
the debt should benefit the bank and the new
and old owners of the firm. China’s banks,
however, are often under the strong influence of
local government, and are sometimes suscepti-
ble to corruption. The privatization of an SOE
often leads to the write-off of an unnecessarily
large amount of debt. This has a negative effect
on the health of the financial system, causing
damage to the whole economy. This effect pro-
vides another link between SOE reform and
social stability.
The multitask theory of SOE reform suggests
that SOEs have played an important role in Chi-
na’s economic growth, namely, providing social
stability at the expense of financial performance,
and it offers a rationale for China’s gradual and
selective approach to privatizing its inefficient
SOEs. Indeed, throughout the reform process,
Chinese leaders have made numerous policy
speeches emphasizing the importance of social
stability. As SOEs are but second-best arrange-
ments for maintaining social stability, the govern-
ment has made great effort in building an efficient
and independent social security system and clean-
ing up its financial system. Anecdotal evidence
also suggests that the government has accelerated
(or slowed down) its speed of privatization when
there is more (or less) job opportunity for laid-off
workers from non-SOEs.
The most direct evidence for our theory comes
from studies on the consequences of privatization.
Existing studies, for example, Jian Su and Gary
Jefferson (forthcoming), have found significant
improvements in firm profitability, a prediction of
our theory. What is less clear is whether privatized
firms would lay off workers and write off loans,
two other predictions of our theory. Using a panel
dataset of 2,866 of China’s SOEs for the period of
1998 to 2003, Bai et al. (2005b) find that the
number of employees in a privatized firm de-
creases with the extent of privatization, and that
both the absolute amount of debt and the financial
expenses to sales ratio also decrease with the de-
gree of nonstate ownership. These results lend
strong support to the multitask theory of SOE
reform.
II. Causes and Consequences of Privatizing
China’s SOEs
The multitask theory of SOE reform has pre-
dictions on the types of SOEs to be chosen for
354 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2006
privatization. Notice that, despite the importance
of social stability, China’s central and local gov-
ernments have divergent interests in maintaining
inefficient SOEs. This is because, due to labor
migration and regional interdependence in the fi-
nancial system, the negative impact of laying off
surplus workers and writing off bad loans is not
restricted to local regions. The local governments
capture only a fraction of the external benefits of
social stability and therefore do not have sufficient
incentives to maintain social stability. The central
government internalizes all the external effects of
social stability, however, and has the proper in-
centive to maintain social stability. Yuanzheng
Cao et al. (1999) also discuss the divergent inter-
ests of central and local government. SOEs in
China are affiliated with the county, city, prov-
ince, or central government. Thus, our theory pre-
dicts that the higher the affiliation of an SOE, the
less likely it will be privatized.
The effect on social stability of privatization
becomes stronger when the firm has more sur-
plus labor. Therefore, the divergence of inter-
ests among different levels of government
increases with the amount of surplus labor. Spe-
cifically, as the amount of surplus labor in an
SOE increases, the cost of privatization in terms
of damage to social stability increases, and the
increase is faster for higher-level governments
than for lower-level governments because the
former internalize the negative externality to a
greater extent. The benefit of privatizing an
SOE also increases with its surplus labor as
more cost saving can be realized after the sur-
plus workers are laid off. The rate of increase in
the benefit is the same for different levels of
government, however. Comparing the changes
in costs and benefits, the cost may increase
faster than the benefit for higher-level govern-
ments and slower for lower-level governments.
Consequently, the multitask theory predicts that
there exists a government-affiliation level be-
low which SOEs with more surplus labor are
more likely to be restructured, but above which
the opposite is true. A similar prediction can
also be made about the level of debt.
These implications of the multitask theory
regarding the effects of government affiliation
and the amounts of surplus labor and debt on the
privatization decision can be empirically tested.
Using a panel dataset of 26,153 of China’s
SOEs for the period of 1995 to 1997, Bai et al.
(2005a) find strong empirical support for these
implications.
An alternative theory regarding the relation-
ship between the level of government affiliation
and the likelihood of privatization of an SOE is
that higher-level governments have stronger fis-
cal capability to bail out failing SOEs, and
therefore SOEs affiliated with higher-level gov-
ernments are less likely to be privatized. How-
ever, this theory has different implications from
the multitask theory on the relationship between
surplus labor and privatization. Specifically, the
fiscal capability theory cannot explain why the
central government is less likely to privatize
firms with more surplus labor, while the multi-
task theory can.
The divergent interests of China’s central and
local governments also have implications for
the consequences of privatization. Lower-level
(such as county or city) governments like to
dump those SOEs that are laden with surplus
labor and debts. This implies that, with privati-
zation of SOEs affiliated with the county or city
governments, there will be substantial layoffs of
surplus workers and massive write-offs of bad
loans. In contrast, higher-level (provincial or
central) governments care more about social
stability, and they are reluctant to let go of those
SOEs for which privatization would lead to
labor layoffs and loan write-offs. This implies
that there may not be any decrease in employ-
ment or debts with privatization of SOEs
affiliated with the provincial or central govern-
ments. These differences in the consequences of
privatization among firms with different levels
of government affiliation may also be the result
of different levels of government imposing dif-
ferent restrictions on the layoff of workers and
write-off of debt in the process of privatization.
Given that laying off unproductive workers and
trimming excessive loans are essential to firm
performance, it is expected that there will be
significant improvements in firm profitability
with privatization of SOEs affiliated with the
county or city governments, but it may not be
the case for SOEs affiliated with the provincial
or central governments.
We test the predictions about the conse-
quences of privatization given above using the
same dataset as in Bai et al. (2005a). All firms
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in the sample were 100 percent state-owned in
1998, but they were privatized at different times
and to different degrees from 1999 to 2003. To
control for potential selection bias problems, we
estimate a firm fixed-effect model as in Roman
Frydman et al. (1999). In addition, we compare
the performance of the SOEs that were privati-
zed between 1999 and 2002 with those that did
not get privatized until 2003, in the time period
between 1998 and 2002. The dependent vari-
ables are logarithm of employment, financial
expenses to sales ratio, and operating income to
sales. The key independent variables are the
interaction terms between non-state ownership
measuring the extent of privatization (denoted
by NonSShr) and the dummy variables regard-
ing the government affiliation levels of SOEs
(denoted by county, city, province, and central).
The estimation results are summarized as
follows.
(1) logarithm of employment
 0.020NonSShr
0.012
County
 0.078NonSShr
0.017
City
 0.066NonSShr
0.031
Province
 0.025NonSShr
0.060
Central
(2) financial expenses to sales ratio
 0.006NonSShr
0.003
County
 0.008NonSShr
0.004
City
 0.003NonSShr
0.007
Province
 0.019NonSShr
0.013
Central
(3) operating income to sales ratio
 0.029NonSShr
0.009
County
 0.030NonSShr
0.013
City
 0.012NonSShr
0.024
Province
 0.060NonSShr
0.074
Central
It is found that both the logarithm of employ-
ment and the financial expenses to sales ratio
(measuring not only the impact of the decreas-
ing amount of debt, but also that of the lower
interests and commissions paid for the remain-
ing debt) decrease with the extent of privatiza-
tion for SOEs affiliated with the county or city
governments, but the opposite holds for SOEs
affiliated with the provincial or central govern-
ments. Consistently, there are significant gains
in the operating income to sales ratio for privat-
izing SOEs affiliated with the county or city
governments, but not for SOEs affiliated with
the provincial or central governments. Wald test
shows that the differences between the coeffi-
cients of the central or provincial government,
and those of the city or county government, are
statistically significant. These results support
the implications of our theory.
In summary, we believe that the coexist-
ence of SOEs and non-SOEs in China is a
second-best arrangement that helps maintain
social stability and thus protects the business
environment of all firms. Empirical evidence
about the types of SOEs to be privatized, and
the consequences of privatization, all support
our theory.
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